October 22, 2008

Commonwealth Court Holds That Medical Providers That Accept Medicare Cannot Seek Additional Payment For Treatment Under the Workers' Compensation Act

In Nickel v. WCAB (Agway Agronomy), No. 719 C.D. 2008, October 22, 2008, the claimant and employer entered into a compromise and release agreement in the context of a claim petition where liability was disputed. Importantly, in the settlement agreement, the employer agreed to pay for the outstanding medical bills that were related to the alleged work injury. Thereafter, the employer filed a fee review which the Commonwealth Court held that it had jurisdiction to do so, because in effect it had accepted liability for their payment. However, the Court also held that the medical provider that was going to be reimbursed for bills by the employer could not seek the higher repricing under the Act after accepting initial payment from Medicaid. Nor can the medical provider seek the difference in the payment from the claimant. In other words, if the medical provider chooses to accept funds from Medicaid, then it cannot seek additional payment under the Workers' Compensation Act.

October 22, 2008

Commonwealth Court Affirms Denial of Claim Petition Based on Course and Scope of MVA

In Waronsky v. WCAB (Mellon Bank), 367 C.D. 2008, October 22, 2008), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the denial of a claim petition by a claimant because it found that the workers' compensation judge correctly determined that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment when she was struck by a car as she was crossing the street from the employer-owned parking garage to the employer's office. This was reached even though the employer encouraged its employees to park in its garage and the employer had a voluntary transportation program that permitted the claimant to pay for parking with pre-tax earnings.

The claimant in this case was determined not to be in the course and scope of her employment because she was not required to park in the employer's garage, and the employer did not issue parking directives or exercise control over the mode of transportation that the claimant chose to get to work. The claimant was free to park her car where she chose. Also, the area where the employer operated did not ban on-street parking, so there was no necessity for the claimant to park in the garage.

October 22, 2008

Commonwealth Court Holds on Appeal Substantial and Competent Evidence Needed to Support Fatal Claim

In Patton v. WCAB (Lane Enterprises, Inc.), 2623 C.D. 2007, filed October 22, 2008, the Commonwealth Court held on appeal that workers' compensation judge's determination that the decedent claimant did not suffer from an occupational disease was supported by substantial and competent evidence. This is because the workers' compensation judge credited the employer's medical witnesses and rejected the assertion that the claimant suffered from an occupational disease.

In fatal claims, while a death certificate is admissible as proof, it is not conclusive proof for both the fact and cause of death. As the Court found, the claimant failed to establish her entitlement to the rebuttable presumption that her husband was employed in an occupation or industry in which the occupational disease was a hazard.

October 10, 2008

C&R Agreement Made Null and Void Where Claimant Dies For Non-Work Related Reasons Before Decision

In Crawford as personal representative of Josephine Crawford, deceased v. WCAB (Centerville Clinics, Inc.), No. 2331 C.D. 2008, filed October 10, 2008, a Compromise and Release Agreement was made null and void by the death of the client prior to the formal order being issued. In the case, the claimant testified regarding a compromise and release agreement before the workers' compensation judge on August 24, 2005. However, before a formal order was issued on August 29, 2005, the claimant passed away from cervical cancer. Thereafter, the employer filed an appeal with the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, which sent the case back to the workers' compensation judge. The workers' compensation judge determined that the parties had agreed under Paragraph 18 of the agreement that the deal would be "null and void upon her death if not approved by a judge." Since the claimant died before such approval, the agreement was in fact, null and void.

Claimants must be sure to keep their attorneys informed of their health issues when entering into settlement agreements, as terminal illness issues of this nature can cause problems with compromise and release agreements.